Questions over the role of an ISI official in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir
Who Will Investigate? Who Will Provide Answers?
By: Khwaja Kabir Ahmed
Almost every country in the world possesses agencies whose primary mandate is to gather and analyze information, assess potential threats, monitor the activities of hostile states and organizations, and provide the state with sensitive data regarding national security. Agencies such as the US CIA, Israel’s Mossad, the UK’s MI5 and MI6, Russia’s former KGB and current FSB, India’s RAW, and Pakistan’s ISI are all part of this vast intelligence apparatus.
Secrecy is the defining characteristic of these agencies. Many of their operations, sources, contacts, methodologies, networks, and—at times—even the identities of their personnel are kept hidden from the public. The obvious reason for this secrecy is that if an adversary discovers who is working where, the channels through which information is being obtained, or the purpose for which a specific network is being utilized, the entire operation could be compromised.
However, it is crucial to understand a fundamental distinction here: not every intelligence officer is an operative who maintains a covert identity. Some officers hold administrative, liaison, analytical, or other roles where their identities are not entirely concealed. Therefore, the mere public disclosure of an officer’s name does not necessarily imply that they hold a secret operational position or that the agency’s principle of secrecy has been breached.
The real issue arises when the name, rank, or role of an official linked to sensitive intelligence duties becomes so widely known in a specific region that it enters the realm of public discourse, political debate, and protest slogans. The issue then extends beyond the identity of the individual; one must also ask whether the situation is compromising the organization’s operational capabilities, resources, networks, and—above all—its professional reputation.
In Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, questions of this nature have recently been raised in the public sphere. The name of an officer associated with a sensitive intelligence role frequently surfaces in social media discussions, protest activities, and public discourse, accompanied by various allegations and claims. It is important to clarify here that an allegation cannot be treated as an established fact simply because it appears in public claims, social media posts, or protest slogans. However, it is equally incorrect to dismiss serious allegations merely because they involve a sensitive institution.
This is not about waging a personal campaign against an individual. The issue is one of principle, the professional reputation of an institution, and, most importantly, Pakistan’s national security interests.
Experiences with intelligence agencies around the world demonstrate that secrecy and accountability are not mutually exclusive. An agency may keep its operations covert, but that does not place it beyond the reach of the law, internal oversight, or state accountability mechanisms.
For instance, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has an established Office of the Inspector General that conducts independent oversight, audits, inspections, and investigations. Additionally, the intelligence committees of both the US Senate and the House of Representatives oversee the CIA’s programs and activities. In other words, while the CIA’s operations may be classified, the agency itself is not exempt from accountability.
In the UK, too, there are various legal and oversight frameworks governing MI5, MI6, and GCHQ. Parliamentary oversight, judicial scrutiny, and independent watchdog bodies form part of this system. If an individual believes that covert powers have been misused, there are established legal avenues for lodging complaints and seeking redress.
A significant example of this emerged from the UK itself. The Director General of MI5 acknowledged an institutional failure in a case where incorrect evidence had been presented to the court. He apologized and stated that the agency had taken steps to improve its policies and training regarding record-keeping, the presentation of evidence in court proceedings, and threat assessment.
This example does not imply that British agencies are infallible. The key lesson is that even when a powerful, secretive agency errs, there must be an institutional mechanism in place to acknowledge the mistake, conduct an investigation, and implement corrective measures.
In Israel, too, Mossad and other sensitive agencies do not operate entirely outside the scope of state oversight. Oversight regarding intelligence and covert operations is conducted through relevant Knesset committees and sub-committees. Admittedly, not every sensitive operation or piece of classified information is disclosed to Parliament, as doing so could compromise national security. However, the fundamental principle remains that covert operations and institutional oversight are distinct matters.
The example of Russia adds further complexity to this comparison. The political and state environment surrounding the former KGB and the current FSB differs significantly from the democratic oversight systems found in the US or the UK. Therefore, it is insufficient to simply claim that intelligence agencies are accountable in the same way across all countries. The crucial distinction lies in the extent to which the law, parliament, the judiciary, and independent bodies can exercise oversight over covert powers. In any responsible system worldwide, the notion that an institution—simply because it deals with national security—should have its officers, decisions, and actions placed beyond scrutiny is untenable. National security does not equate to treason when questions are raised; in fact, the very demands of national security often necessitate internal questioning regarding whether authority rests with the right person, whether actions comply with the law, whether procedures are professional, and whether the institution’s reputation is being compromised.
This discussion is particularly significant for Pakistan, given that the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) 2026 “Pakistan Country Focus Report”—while identifying the ISI as the country’s primary intelligence agency—has raised questions concerning its role and oversight. According to the report, there is no specific legislation or formal oversight mechanism clearly regulating the ISI’s activities.
While this is an investigative report by an international body—and it would be incorrect to treat every statement within it as an indisputable verdict—the fact that a formal study by such an organization questions the powers and oversight mechanisms of one of Pakistan’s most sensitive institutions warrants, at the very least, a serious national debate.
After all, if the United States maintains an internal Inspector General and Congressional oversight for the CIA, the United Kingdom upholds multiple avenues of parliamentary and judicial oversight for its intelligence agencies, and Israel employs a system of parliamentary oversight for its intelligence operations, why should the call for clear, robust institutional oversight regarding the powers of an immensely powerful and sensitive entity like the ISI be viewed as extraordinary in Pakistan?
This is not a question posed by an adversary; it is a question befitting a responsible state. The significance of the issue is further heightened when it concerns a disputed and sensitive region like Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Intense public debate is already underway here regarding the movement for civil rights, protests, arrests, political activities, and the role of state institutions. For instance:
The arrests and alleged enforced disappearances of hundreds of active workers—including core members of the Jammu and Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee and key leaders of the movement—during the peaceful civil rights campaign that has been ongoing in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir for over three years have raised a deeply serious question.
Over the past three months, reports have emerged regarding the arrest or alleged abduction and subsequent enforced disappearance of several key leaders of the movement, including Advocate Raja Amjad Ali Khan, Advocate Tauseef Jarral, Anjum Zaman, and Sajjad Pothi. In addition to them, hundreds of active members of the movement are facing various legal cases, arrests, and detentions.
On June 30, 2026, Shaukat Nawaz Mir—a core member of the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee and a prominent leader of the public rights movement—was publicly arrested by security forces. Since his arrest, persistent questions have been raised regarding his detention, whereabouts, and legal status. A crucial question arises: under what legal authority is he being detained, and what are the legal requirements for producing him before a court?
Serious allegations and questions are circulating publicly regarding the role and alleged influence of an official from a sensitive agency in this entire situation. It is a fact that a public allegation does not, in itself, constitute proof of a crime against an individual. However, when allegations of this nature concerning an official of a sensitive state institution become a recurring subject of public discourse, questions must be directed not only at the accusers but also at the institution in question: what internal and impartial mechanisms does it employ to verify the veracity of these allegations?
The fundamental question is not about declaring any single individual guilty; rather, it concerns how authority was exercised—and under what legal mandate—regarding the arrest, detention, and alleged enforced disappearances of citizens in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Who bears the responsibility, and who will hold that authority accountable? If the name of an intelligence official is being publicly linked to such incidents, is it sufficient for the relevant agency to remain silent, or do the imperatives of national security and institutional credibility demand an internal review of these questions? This is precisely where the issues of intelligence authority, civil liberties, and institutional accountability intersect.
Public claims have also surfaced alleging the involvement of various state agencies or personnel in certain fatalities, arrests, detentions, and alleged enforced disappearances that occurred during peaceful movements for public rights. However, without independent and credible investigations, these claims cannot be treated as established facts.
If an individual is linked to an officer from an intelligence agency, the solution is not to immediately accept the allegation as truth. Conversely, the solution is not to forgo an investigation simply because the allegation involves a sensitive agency.
The correct path lies in an independent and professional investigation.
If a state agency or official is accused of illegal detention or any other serious act in the case of Shaukat Nawaz Mir, an impartial investigation into the allegation must be conducted. If the allegation is unfounded, an investigation can prove it so. If the investigation substantiates the allegation, accountability must be determined in accordance with the law. In either scenario, the institution’s credibility will be strengthened.
Another fundamental question arises here: what is the function of an intelligence agency?
The primary objective of intelligence is to gather information, assess threats, alert the state, and bolster national security. Intelligence and political control are not one and the same. A national security agency should not serve as a guardian of the political interests of a government, a political party, or an individual; rather, it must safeguard the state’s interests, the constitutional order, and national security. If a public perception begins to form that a covert agency is being used to suppress political dissent, protests, or movements for public rights, the issue transcends politics; it becomes a matter of the national security institution’s own credibility.
For national security is not merely about guarding borders; safeguarding public trust in state institutions is also a component of national security.
Therefore, if the name of an officer holding a sensitive intelligence position becomes widely known across the region, if their identity becomes entangled in protest politics, and if serious allegations begin to be leveled against them, a professional agency must—at the very least—ask itself: what is the actual situation?
Is this truly the appropriate and authorized role for the officer in question?
Is the fact that their identity has become so publicly prominent compromising the agency’s operational security?
Are the allegations circulating against the officer merely political propaganda, or do they contain substance warranting an institutional inquiry?
Is the officer’s presence casting doubt on the agency’s impartiality and credibility?
And if such questions persist, is it not in the agency’s best interest to activate its internal accountability mechanism rather than remain silent?
In a professional state, reassigning an officer is not an admission of defeat. If serious questions arise regarding a specific posting, reviewing the situation—and, if necessary, changing the officer’s responsibilities or conducting an inquiry—is a sign of institutional strength, not weakness.
By the same token, it is unjust to deem an officer guilty simply because their name is being invoked during protests. A name being mentioned is not proof; an allegation is not evidence; and public perception is not a judicial verdict.
Yet, this same principle must apply to state institutions as well: the mere possession of authority is not proof of innocence.
Ultimately, the real issue is not the individual, but the system.
The fundamental question is: if serious allegations repeatedly surface against an official of a sensitive agency, who will investigate them? If an allegation is false, what steps will the agency take to refute it? If the allegation is true, who will take action? And if the mere presence of an officer becomes detrimental to the agency’s reputation, operational requirements, or public trust, who will make the decision?
A comparative analysis of intelligence systems worldwide reveals at least one basic principle: operating in secrecy does not grant immunity from accountability; rather, covert authority demands even more robust accountability.
Greater power entails greater responsibility.
Greater covert authority necessitates greater internal accountability.
And the more sensitive the domain, the greater the need for professional prudence.
The questions currently being raised by the public in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir cannot simply be dismissed as mere political rhetoric. If the allegations are baseless, a transparent investigation and the disclosure of facts would actually benefit the state. If there have been violations of law or procedure, identifying those responsible is also in the state’s interest.
For the true strength of any institution lies not in people fearing to question it, but in the public’s confidence that if a question is raised, the institution will respond through the rule of law, reasoned argument, and transparent internal accountability.
Ultimately, the question remains:
If an official from a covert agency is no longer unknown to the public—if their name has become a rallying cry for protests and is linked to serious allegations—is silence truly in the agency’s best interest? Or is it in the agency’s interest to raise these questions internally?
This is not a question posed by an adversary.
It is a question concerning the principles of national security.
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