Zulfiqar Ali
Former Award-Winning Journalist, BBC
Following the 13th Amendment, the ruling elite in Pakistan-administered Kashmir significantly expanded their own privileges and procured luxury vehicles, while the region’s dependence on Pakistan increased substantially. This amendment not only led to a dramatic surge in corruption but also effectively rendered the region’s political and administrative elite immune to accountability and oversight.
Eight years after the devolution of powers, the general public has received nothing but promises; meanwhile, criticizing those in power can now carry a prison sentence of up to seven years.
In June 2018, the Muslim League (N) government in Pakistan-administered Kashmir—led by Raja Farooq Haider Khan—passed the 13th Constitutional Amendment. Under this amendment, the administrative, legislative, and financial powers previously held by the ‘Kashmir Council’ were transferred to the regional government.
Eight years later, the fundamental question remains: have these powers benefited the common people, or have they merely strengthened the political and administrative elite? With a revenue of 87 billion rupees, non-developmental expenditures have reached 230 billion rupees.
Prior to the 13th Constitutional Amendment, the responsibility for tax collection rested with the Kashmir Council. In the 2017-18 fiscal year, the Council collected 23 billion rupees in taxes. Of this amount, 5.26 billion rupees—derived from indirect taxes—were allocated to the government of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, while approximately 18 billion rupees, generated through direct taxes, went into the Kashmir Council’s accounts. The Council retained 20 percent of the revenue from direct taxes to cover its administrative expenses and fund development projects in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, while 14.14 billion rupees were transferred to the regional government.
Following the transfer of financial powers to the regional government under the 13th Constitutional Amendment, the Kashmir Council was no longer responsible for tax collection. However, this shift did not lead to financial self-reliance for the region. The government failed to generate sufficient revenue to cover even its own administrative costs—let alone fund development projects or public services from its own resources.
In the 2025-26 fiscal year, the government of Pakistan-administered Kashmir collected approximately 70 billion rupees in taxes. This indicates an increase of only 47 billion rupees in tax revenue over eight years. Of this total, approximately 20 billion rupees were derived from taxes on banks. Although the regional government collects these taxes, its legal authority to do so has been questioned, given that banks fall under the jurisdiction of the Pakistani federal government.
Including tax revenue, the regional government’s total income for the 2025-26 fiscal year stood at 87 billion rupees. Of this, revenue generated from its own internal sources amounted to only 620 million rupees. These sources encompass agriculture, forestry, minerals, fisheries and wildlife, poultry and dairy farming, tourism, and industry. Expenditures—covering salaries, allowances, and operational costs for the departments overseeing these sectors—totaled 5.5 billion rupees.
The government also earned a profit of 15 billion rupees from electricity. However, the regional government does not generate this electricity itself; instead, the Government of Pakistan provides it at subsidized rates. The regional government earns a profit by selling this electricity to local consumers. Additionally, one billion rupees were generated through telecommunication taxes.
In the 2025-26 fiscal year, the region’s non-development expenditures amounted to 230 billion rupees, of which approximately 195 billion rupees were spent on running the political and administrative apparatus. These expenditures encompass salaries, allowances, pensions, and operational costs. The political and administrative system in this region has expanded disproportionately; however, its performance does not justify such heavy expenditure.
Pakistan has consistently provided financial assistance to cover administrative costs and support infrastructure development. In the 2025-26 fiscal year, the Government of Pakistan allocated a variable grant of 140 billion rupees to the region, along with 32 billion rupees specifically for infrastructure development.
Nevertheless, the utilization of these grants is marred by widespread corruption. Billions of rupees are siphoned off annually under the guise of wheat subsidies, and large-scale corruption has also plagued development projects. Between July 2016 and June 2026, the Government of Pakistan provided over 260 billion rupees to the regional government for infrastructure development; yet, no significant projects are visible on the ground.
Conversely, Pakistan has independently completed projects worth billions of rupees for the region’s development under the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP). Work on some projects is currently underway, and several new initiatives are being launched—the tangible results of which are evident on the ground.
Furthermore, Pakistan has provided 74 billion rupees in electricity subsidies to the government of the region under its administration, in addition to 10 billion rupees in assistance through the Benazir Income Support Programme. Billions of rupees are also being provided under the Health Card and Ehsaas Scholarship programs, while financial assistance has been extended to universities through the Higher Education Commission.
In the 2017-18 fiscal year, the non-development expenditures of Pakistan-administered Kashmir stood at 73 billion rupees; by 2025-26, this figure had risen to 230 billion rupees, placing an extraordinary burden on Pakistan’s taxpayers.
The region has failed to generate sufficient revenue to cover its own administrative costs, yet the perks and privileges enjoyed by the political and administrative elite have continued to grow. This trend was particularly pronounced during the tenure of the Muslim League (N) government—led by Raja Farooq Haider Khan—as well as under the administrations that followed.
Following the 13th Constitutional Amendment, the privileges of former presidents were increased once, and those of former prime ministers twice, between 2018 and 2023.
In November 2023, the coalition government granted further privileges to former prime ministers. These included the right to free accommodation in any guest house, circuit house, or rest house owned by the government of Pakistan-administered Kashmir—whether located within the region or elsewhere in Pakistan.
Between 2016 and 2023, luxury vehicles worth approximately two billion rupees were purchased for the president, prime minister, ministers, and bureaucrats—even though the existing government fleet already contained an excess of vehicles. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) government granted senior government officials ‘Super Executive Allowances’ and ‘Executive Allowances,’ ranging from 150,000 to 400,000 rupees per month.
In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the system of governance has long served the interests of the elite. This class has been the primary beneficiary, while the general public has been treated more like subjects than citizens. Following the 13th Constitutional Amendment, this pattern of behavior became even more brazen.
The ruling elite showed little regard for the funds contributed by Pakistani taxpayers, nor did they show any consideration for the hardships and sacrifices endured by the people of Indian-administered Kashmir. Instead, these hardships and sacrifices were exploited to further their own political agendas. Their conduct was akin to that of monarchs who spend the earnings of others as if the wealth were their own.
The political and administrative elite considered themselves above any form of accountability, failing to view themselves as answerable to the people of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the government and taxpayers of Pakistan, the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan, or the people of Indian-administered Kashmir.
The agricultural sector serves as an example of the failure to generate revenue from available resources. In the 2017-18 fiscal year, this sector generated 8 million rupees in revenue. Seven years later, in the 2025-26 fiscal year—despite an expenditure of 1.3 billion rupees on salaries, allowances, and operational costs—revenue had actually declined to just 5 million rupees. The situation in other sectors has been much the same.
The political elite also altered constitutional provisions to serve their own interests and, at times, violated the constitution altogether.
Under the 13th Constitutional Amendment, the number of ministers could not exceed 12. Yet, in 2023, the very same members who had passed this amendment in 2018 voted to remove the restriction—a change that served their own political and financial interests.
In 2023, a Speaker was elected to the 53-member assembly with only 19 votes; this same individual subsequently became the Acting President and continued to hold that position in an unconstitutional manner. Similarly, one individual contested the election for Prime Minister—and was elected—without first resigning from his position as Speaker. After taking the oath as Prime Minister, he then resumed his role as Speaker and adjourned the assembly session. These events demonstrate that when constitutional constraints hinder those in power, they do not hesitate to alter or disregard them.
On April 30, 2025, the coalition government led by Chaudhry Anwar-ul-Haq enacted a law formalizing the procedures for the utilization of local government development budgets—a move that occurred while India and Pakistan stood on the brink of war. Under this framework, local government development funds were being disbursed through members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) rather than through elected local government representatives.
In February 2025, the High Court of Pakistan-administered Kashmir had declared this procedure illegal and struck it down, ruling that, under the Local Government Act of 1990, such funds must be spent through elected local government representatives.
Instead of complying with the court’s ruling, the coalition government passed legislation through the Assembly to reinstate the very same mechanism.
In 2023, Section 505 of the colonial-era Azad Penal Code (1860) was amended. Under this amendment, criticizing the political and administrative elite can now result in a prison sentence of up to seven years, in addition to a fine.
The powers devolved to the region under the 13th Constitutional Amendment have failed to strengthen the economy, improve public services, or reduce dependence on Pakistan. Instead, the regional government continues to rely on financial assistance from Pakistan to cover its expenditures. Therefore, the real question is not whether powers were devolved in 2018, but rather who benefited from this devolution: the general public, or the political and administrative elite? Data and examples indicate that, following the 13th Amendment, these powers were used to expand the privileges of those in power—rather than to address the problems faced by the public—all while there was no effective accountability regarding the use of public funds. This style of governance has severely undermined the public’s trust in the regional system.
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